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Abstract
The value of subjective attitude parameters in and abroad were introduced in this paper on the basis of the third generation 
prospect theory, aiming to make a further study on the preference reversal between willingness to accept, willingness to pay and 
choice. Results suggest that people's significant reversal activities are relatively constant, and there are standard preference 
reversal in the group of WTA/WTP and the group of WTA/Choice, and non-standard preference reversal in the group of 
WTP/Choice. Besides, Chinese are more risk-seeking in gain and more risk-aversion in loss than Americans while Americans are 
more likely to present preference reversal compared to Chinese.
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The study of preference reversal originated from the experimental research by Lichtenstein and Slovic in 1968. It 
recorded an experiment on lotteries with similar expectation value, in which subjects are supposed to choose 
between a lottery with a high probability of winning a low amount (P-bet) and a lottery with a low probability of 
winning a high amount ($-bet) and price them. Results showed that subjects tended to choose P-bet over $-bet and 
they stated a higher selling price for $-bet than P-bet. Thus, if choice and selling prices are viewed as two forms of 
preference expression, individual preferences seem to depend on which one is used, implying that preferences may 
be reversed when shifting from one form to another. It is called preference reversal phenomenon (PRP).
Since then, studies on this phenomenon are done by a lot of researchers, who found that this irrational behavior
exists when WTA (willingness to accept),WTP(willingness to pay) and choice are matched by pairs. Some of 
empirical documents average WTA and WTP as pricing, and then study the preference reversal between reservation 
price and choice. Ganzach(1996) found preference reversal between WTP and WTA. Casey(1991) discovered the 
interaction between income value and preference reversal. Schmeltzer(2004) found that when information is 
presented in a fixed pattern, the PR in choice and pricing disappears. Grether and Plott(1979) put doubt into the 
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existence of PR and proposed that it may be caused by incentive, experiments errors or income effect. However in
their modified experiments PR still exists systematically and robustly.Besides, Loomes etc(2010) controled factors 
neglected in previous studies and found subjects PR did not decay in repeated market.
There are also lots of other explanations to this irrational behavior, such as Regret Theory, Contingent Weight 
Theory(Tversky,1988), Expression Theory(Goldstein and Einhorn,1987), Anchoring and Insufficient Adjustment 
Theory(Slovic and Lichtenstein,1983) etc. It is believed in evaluation theory(Hsee,1999) that in separate evaluation 
mode, easily-evaluated attributes plays a comparative critical role in decision; In joint evaluation mode, difficultly-
evaluated attributes can become more easily-evaluated through comparing with each other and import more 
influence on decision. When this change is significant to subjects' preference, preference reversal will occur. In 
choosing between the two lotteries, pricing is mainly affected by simple attribute result- income, and choice is 
mainly impressed by difficult attribute-probability（Slovic and Lichtenstein，1968; Tversky, 1990; Irwin,1994).
Above all, there are already large amount of documents on preference reversal and its formation. Among the 
documents, the explanation based on the first generation prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,1979) and
Cumulative Prospect Theory(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) are the mainstreams. According to Prospect theory, we 
hold the opinion that people are generally risk-aversion in gain, but when winning probability of $ bet decreases to 
almost zero and the possible income increases to a high extent, people will amplify the difference between perceived 
“possible incomes" and assign $ bet greater weight, which results in a preference to $ bet. On the contrary, people 
are generally risk-seeking in loss, but with the decrease of winning probability of $ bet and the increase of loss in 
$ bet, people still tend to be risk-averse even if the loss of P bet is fixed. All in all, the differences exist mainly 
because of the altering of choice preference with the different probability portfolio, whereas in seperate evaluation, 
the behavior tendency toward WTA and WTP will remain the same.
In 2008, Schmidt introduced dynamic reference points based on the first and second generation prospect theory 
and put forward the third prospect theory PT3. Compared with the former prospect theories, PT3
Prospect theory has been developed for more than 30 years and scholars have accumulated certain researches on 
risk attitude parameter α, weight parameter β and loss aversion parameter λ. This study intends to investigate the 
correlativity and preference reversal between WTA, WTP and choice on the basis of these three subjective attitude 
parameters. The paper will be of certain theoretical and practical significance in analyzing the theory's reliability of 
the explanations to risk transactions and decision-making behaviors.
raises the function 
in behavioral modeling and theoretic explanation to risk and uncertainty transactions. Schimidt analyzed the 
preference reversal between WTA and choice by introducing status quo as dynamic reference point, and stated that it 
is mostly determined by the coactions of risk attitude parameter α, weight parameter β and loss aversion parameter λ. 
The influence of status quo bias and loss aversion on risk choices have been proven as early as Harless’s experiment 
in 1989. It fully demonstrates the capacity of the third generation prospect theory in explaining preference reversal 
in lotteries. But how these subjective parameters influence preference reversal specifically. What about their 
relationships. Can they explain the practice and guide it. These questions remain unanswered and call for further 
studies.
1 Dynamic modeling based on PT3
PT3 is modeled by Schmidt as follows:
Considering a finite state space },1|{ nisS
i
……== , each state is corresponds a probability ip , 1=∑ ip . X is the 
result of State S on the premise of P . A is a set of all acts. Specific acts Afh ∈, . They are functions from S to x ,
so Xsh i ∈)( ， Xsf i ∈)( . α is risk attitude toward objective income, and λ is loss aversion parameter in loss 
situations. Let h be the dynamic reference point, then power function of PT3 is:
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The definition of rank-dependent decision weight follows the RDSEU (reference-dependent subjective expected 
utility theory). It should be determined considering probability and ordered position of act f relative to reference 
point h. For example, we have ij > if and only if )](),([)](),([
iijj
shsfvshsfv > ,.When h is a constant act, the third 
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generation theory equals to CPT (cumulative prospect theory).
Compare f and h under state
i
s , if )(h)( ii ssf < then there is a strong loss. Define −m as the number of states with 
strong loss. If )(h)(
ii
ssf ≥ , there is a weak gain. Define −+ −= mnm as the number of states with weak gain. Then the 
weight function of PT3 is:
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Where ββββ /1)]1[/()( ppppw −+=                       （3）
Let F be the set of states is such that )()( ii shsf ≥ and let G be the set of states js such that )()( jj shsf < , then the 
utility function of PT3
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is: 
   （4）
   The function refers to the utility of act f relative to dynamic reference point h,. When 0h)V(f, ≥ , 
0h)V(f, = , 0h)V(f, < , then hf h≥ , hf h~ or hf h , they present taking h as the reference point, f is weakly preferred to h, f 
is indifferent to h, or f is strongly preferred to f. 
2 Introduction of present parameters
Smith has been mentioned in his paper that since PT3 develops mainly based on the first and second generation 
prospect theory, the present parameters can also be applied to PT3
As to power function and weight decision function, PT
. Grounded on the study of Booij, we analyzed the 
value of prospect theory parameters in present documents and elicited only two papers fully considered all three of α,
β and λ( see Tversky and Kahneman(1992); Harrison and Rutstr m(2009)). To fully study the difference in Chinese 
and western, we also refer to Chinese studies and finally get four groups of prospect theory parameters.
3
Table 1 selected prospect theory values
does not consider the difference under gain and loss. We 
elicit these parameters by averaging gain and loss situation. So the groups in the end show as follows.
Sample source α β λ
Tversky and Kahneman(1992) America 0.88 0.65 1.38/2.25
Harrison and Rutstrom(2009) America 0.72 0.91 1.38/2.25
Zeng (2005) China 1.12 0.52 1.38/2.25
Peng (2008) China 1.15 0.57 1.38/2.25
3 Study on preference reversal in WTA, WTP and CE
3.1 Modeling deduction of boundaries in WTA, WTP and choice
Given h lottery: an increment of wealth x ( or an decrement of wealth x) with probability p, and nothing 
otherwise. Act A refers to selling lottery in WTA. Act P refers to buying lottery in WTP. Act C refers to the certainty
equivalent of the lottery h. As is shown in table 3:
Table 2 derivation of WTA, WTP and CE
x>0 h A P C
p x(-x) WTA WTP CE
1-p 0 WTA WTP CE
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    Let 0),( =hAV , 0),( =PhV , )C,0()0,( VhV = and insert in formula(4). Then formulate WTA,WTP and CE.
Table 3 expressions of WTA, WTP and CE in loss or gain
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According to table 3, WTA in gain is opposite to WTP in loss, while WTP in gain is opposite to WTA in loss. 
Based on PT3
Set P bet: an increment of wealth x=1/p (or an decrement of wealth x=1/p) with probability p, and nothing 
otherwise; Set $ bet: an increment of wealth y=r/q or an decrement of wealth y=r/q) with probability q, and nothing 
otherwise. It requires p>q, rp>q, which means P bet is high probability but low reward while $ bet is low probability 
but high reward. So the standard and non-standard preference reversal can expressed as follows:
, WTA and WTP differ with the reference point altering. So WTA in gain is the compensation of WTP 
in loss. Since there is no disparity in gain and loss situation no matter when it is α or β, CE are opposite each other 
in gain and loss.
Table 4 expressions of preference reversal
preference reversal
WTA/WTP WTA/选择 WTP/选择
WTA WTP WTA 选择 WTP 选择
standard PR $ P $ P $ P
non-standard PR P $ P $ P $
Insert the rewards and probability of P bet and $ in prospect theory model( formula3) get the expressions of WTA, 
WTP and choice as PA 、 $A 、 PP 、 $P 、 PC 、 $C . Then the method Schimidt used was introduced to achieve 
the boundaries of WTA, WTP and choice that let $AAP = , $PPP = and $CCP = . On the boundaries, P bet and 
$ are both preferred equally.
Table 5 expressions of boundaries
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3.2 preference reversal analysis in WTA, WTP and choice 
the impact of loss aversion parameter λ and lottery relative value r
Table 6 code
codes WTP WTA choice
r=1.2 P1 A1 C1
r=1 P2 A2 C2
r=0.6 P3 A3 C3
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
概率p
概
率
q概
率
q
λ=1.38,α=0.88,β=0.65
               r=1.2
               r=1
               r=0.6
q=p
q=0.6*p
P2(A2)
C2
C1
A2(P2)
P1(A1)
A3(P3)
C3
P3(A3)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
概率p
概
率
q
λ=2.25,α=0.88,β=0.65
               r=1.2
               r=1
               r=0.6
A2(P2)
P1(A1) C1
P2(A2)
C2
q=0.6*p
A3(P3)
C3
P3(A3)
q=p
fig.1. whenλ=1.38,preference with different r       fig.2 .when λ=2.25, preference with different r
In the figure, it is loss situation in parentheses, else is gain. The choice boundary C is equivalent in gain and loss. 
Besides, because P>q, rp>q are the basic conditions for the lottery, r = 1 only if the right area of q = p was 
established; else if r = 0.6, it will be only the right area of q = 0.6 p.
In gain above each boundary, P bet is preferred in WTA, WTP and choice while $ bet is preferred below it. When 
r=1.2, P bet is preferred on the right of boundary, while $ bet is preferred to the left. In loss, it is opposite.
Property 1 When r is a fixed value, under the different probability combinations of lottery P and $, people will 
behave different preference in WTA, WTP and choice. The mostly decision behavior will act as follows:
Table 7 preference under different probability combination
area/preference WTA WTP choice
WTA/WTP
PR
WTA/choice
PR
WTP/choice
PR
1 P P P NO NO NO
2 $ P P standard PR standard PR NO
3 $ P $ standard PR NO non-standard PR
4 $ $ $ NO NO NO
Through the table above, there are only standard PRs in WTA/WTP or WTA/choice, while only non-standard 
preference reversal between WTP and choice. Lichtenstein and Slovic、Knez and Smith, Casey, etc found that the 
standard PRs are significantly less than non-standard PRs in WTA and choice, and sometimes even does not exist. It 
seems that WTP in pricing tends to reduce standard PRs and increase non-standard ones. Nevertheless, in many 
empirical researches although it is not remarkable, but there still exist non-standard PRs in WTA/choice and 
WTA/WTP as well as standard PRs in WTP/choice. We can infer that the small part of findings which are different 
from this paper is because of their different subjective parameters with the present Chinese and American situations. 
Property 2 As λ increases, the possibility increases, that $ bet has a higher selling price and P bet has a higher 
buying price. There is no change in choice.
As is shown in chart 1, chart2, as λ increases, in gain WTA boundary move upwards, WTP boundary move 
downwards. In loss, it is opposite.
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According to Prospect theory, in respect that $ bet yields higher than P bet, sellers take selling bet as loss, and 
$ bet will loss more. As a result, the larger λ sellers have, the higher selling price $ bet will be endowed. Meanwhile, 
as buyers, money is considered loss to them, and they must cover the loss by the expected earnings from the lottery. 
So, the larger λ the buyers have, the more possibly they will choose P bet. 
Property 3 When other parameters are fixed, as r increases, people prefer $ bet in gain, as well as P bet in loss.
As is shown above, with the increase of r, all boundaries go to upper right, expanding the regions in which the 
$ bet is favored in gain and disliked in loss. The intuition for this is that, as the value of r increases, the attraction of 
$ bet is amplified with its larger rewards, which is reverse in loss situation.
Property 4 Preference reversal is more possible in large probability portfolios than small ones.
According to figure 1 and 2, area 1 and 2 are expanded with the increase of probability p and q. Liu(2008) 
demonstrates that there is significant discrepancy in preference scores from large probability portfolios to small ones. 
When items are presented with large probabilities, preference reversal is higher.
Sino-us situation comparison
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fig.5.                                      fig.6.
In gain, in the left area of each boundary, $ bet is preferred in WTA, WTP and choice while P bet is preferred in 
the right area. If and only if α=0.72，β=0.91, P bet is preferred in the area below the boundary, while $ bet is 
preferred in the area above the boundary. In loss, it is opposite.
Property 5 Considering the preference of Sino-us, Chinese are more risk-seeking than Americans in gain, and more 
risk-averse in loss.
The charts illustrate that no matter whether r>1 or r<1, Chinese boundaries are higher than Americans’. It means 
that compared with Americans, in WTA, WTP and choice in gain, Chinese are more likely to choose $ bet than 
Americans and show a larger risk-seeking inclination. However, in loss Chinese prefer P bet more likely than 
Americans, which shows more risk-aversion in this act. The studies of Bontempo (1997), Weber and Hsee(1998),
Yates (1998), Fan and Xiaoet al(2006) indicate that Asians has stronger risk-seeking tendency and higher level of 
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overconfidence. Weber analyzes the impact of risk propensity coefficient and probability perception to Sino-us. The 
results note that the former factor is not significant; instead, it is mainly because Chinese undertakes the probability 
risk.
Property 6 Americans presents higher-leveled preference reversal than Chinese.
As is shown in figure 3-6, Americans own larger preference reversal areas in regional 1 and 2. So, preference 
reversal is more probable in Americans than Chinese. Joyce (2003) found that different from that in risk-neutral state, 
preference reversal reflected in strong risk-seeking or risk-averse subjects is much weaker. Corresponding with 
Property 5 preference reversal is more possible to Americans due to Americans’ lower risk attitude in gain and loss.
Property 7 If α>β, the area of preference reversal where r<1 will be larger than that where r>1. Else if α<β, it is the 
opposite.
According to figure 3 and 5, if α>β, compared with those where r=1.2, preference reversal area 2 and 3 are larger 
where r=0.6. Else if α<β, there are larger preference reversal areas where r=1.2.
Where α>β, β leads to the increase in the irrationality to lottery's probability so that the $ bet relatively become 
more attractive. If r<1, it will weaken this irrationality and enlarge P bet's effect. Therefore, it will have larger 
preference reversal areas. Where α<β, people will reveal stronger bias in risk attitude and perform more serious risk-
aversion in gain as well as risk-seeking in loss. It also means they will prefer P bet in gain and $ bet in loss. At this 
moment, if r>1, it can weaken the effect of this phenomenon and expand preference reversal areas.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we investigated the preference reversal in WTA, WTP and choice among Americans and Chinese 
based on the values of three existed prospect theory subjective attitude parameters. We hold the opion that people 
have different preference to different lotteries in WTA, WTP and CE due to distinct probability portfolios as well as 
the variety of their risk attitude parameters, weight decision parameters and loss aversion parameters.. Several 
conclusions are as following:
Firstly, the results suggest that people's significant reversal activities are relatively constant, and there exist 
standard preference reversal in the group of WTA/WTP and the group of WTA/Choice, and non-standard preference 
reversal in the group of WTP/Choice. Secondl y, Chinese are more risk-seeking in gain and more risk-aversion in 
loss than Americans while Americans are more likely to present preference reversal compared to Chinese.
Although in practice, preference reversal behavior in WTA, WTP and choice are not as significant as that in 
laboratories, but as early as in 1993, Bohm and Lind, etc found it still exists doubtlessly under a certain proportion.
Therefore, it can be used to risk transactions and decision-making engineering problems in reality, based on the 
analysis of its reliability under the third generation prospect theory and scientific testing. For example, in marketing 
field, through predicting people's choosing or buying tendency, it can lend insight to making pricing-decision to risk 
commodities such as stock, lottery and insurance. From the perspective of policy management such as tax planning, 
it can help to refer a extent to tax evasion punishment which can drive people pay taxes regularly, etc.
Restricted to the functions of third generation prospect theory, we did not analyze the situations with both gain 
and loss. Thereby, we cannot judge and predict these kinds of cases in actual problems. Besides, this article analyzes 
WTA, WTP and choice in pairs and reckon without the absolute value of the commodity, i.e. we eliminate the 
influence of framing effect. However in many documents, significant influence of framing effect on the preference 
reversal in WTA, WTP and choice has been validly proved and it can be referred for our further study. Above all, 
part of inferences in this article has already been empirically tested, but there still are problems calling for further 
empirical study. And it is needed to be tested in evidence whether the conclusions in risky commodities can be 
applied to non-market goods as environment and health.
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